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Abstract
Technology for comprehensive identification of biothreats in environmental and clinical specimens is needed to protect
citizens in the case of a biological attack. This is a challenge because there are dozens of bacterial and viral species that
might be used in a biological attack and many have closely related near-neighbor organisms that are harmless. The
biothreat agent, along with its near neighbors, can be thought of as a biothreat cluster or a biocluster for short. The ability to
comprehensively detect the important biothreat clusters with resolution sufficient to distinguish the near neighbors with an
extremely low false positive rate is required. A technological solution to this problem can be achieved by coupling biothreat
group-specific PCR with electrospray ionization mass spectrometry (PCR/ESI-MS). The biothreat assay described here detects
ten bacterial and four viral biothreat clusters on the NIAID priority pathogen and HHS/USDA select agent lists. Detection of
each of the biothreat clusters was validated by analysis of a broad collection of biothreat organisms and near neighbors
prepared by spiking biothreat nucleic acids into nucleic acids extracted from filtered environmental air. Analytical
experiments were carried out to determine breadth of coverage, limits of detection, linearity, sensitivity, and specificity.
Further, the assay breadth was demonstrated by testing a diverse collection of organisms from each biothreat cluster. The
biothreat assay as configured was able to detect all the target organism clusters and did not misidentify any of the near-
neighbor organisms as threats. Coupling biothreat cluster-specific PCR to electrospray ionization mass spectrometry
simultaneously provides the breadth of coverage, discrimination of near neighbors, and an extremely low false positive rate
due to the requirement that an amplicon with a precise base composition of a biothreat agent be detected by mass
spectrometry.
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Introduction
Technology for detecting biothreat agents requires accurate
identification of a broad array of bacterial and viral organisms that
can cause severe disease and/or death, whether they occur as a
result of a biological attack or from a natural source in the
environment. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) has compiled a list of priority pathogens for
biodefense (http://www.niaid.nih.gov) and several of these are
also defined as select agents (http://www.selectagents.gov/) by
various agencies such as Health and Human Services (HHS) and
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (some of the
vaccine and live attenuated strains are, however, excluded from
the select agents list: http://www.selectagents.gov/Select%20
Agents%20and%20Toxins%20Exclusions.html). These bioagents
are often virtually indistinguishable from a group of phylogenet-
ically related species or subspecies often referred to as ‘‘near
neighbors’’ [1]. Near neighbors to biothreat agents may be human
pathogens or harmless environmental organisms. The biothreat
agent along with its near neighbors can be thought of as a biothreat
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e36528cluster or biocluster for short. When monitoring for biothreat agents,
it is important to determine whether any organisms from the
biothreat clusters are present and to precisely identify the organism
as a biothreat agent or a near neighbor. In some cases, the near
neighbors are commonly found in the environment, and it is
possible that a pathogenic near neighbor of a biothreat agent
might deliberately be chosen for use in a biological attack. Thus,
effective biosensor technology must be capable of identifying a
broad array of biothreat agents and distinguishing these threats
from their near neighbors unambiguously.
This requirement presents a problem for conventional molec-
ular methods where specific PCR is used in conjunction with
probes to detect specific bioagents. Not only are potentially
pathogenic near neighbors present in a specimen often not
distinguished, but the near neighbors sometimes react to produce
false positives for the biothreat agent. To overcome these
limitations, we have developed a new strategy for biothreat
identification that couples biothreat cluster-specific PCR amplifi-
cation to electrospray ionization/mass spectrometry (PCR/ESI-
MS) [2–4]. The biothreat assay is performed on a hardware
platform with prototypes known as TIGER [4] and as the Ibis
T5000 [2,5] that is now marketed commercially as the Abbott
PLEX-ID [6]. In the PCR/ESI-MS approach, PCR primers are
designed to amplify regions of the genomes of all species from the
entire biothreat cluster, encompassing groups of organisms that
include the biothreat and the associated near-neighbor organisms.
The primers are designed to target genomic regions sufficiently
conserved such that amplification occurs comprehensively within a
biothreat cluster, but not outside of the cluster. The amplification
products are then analyzed by mass spectrometry, which weighs
the amplicons with sufficient mass accuracy that the base
composition of A, G, C, and T nucleotides that make up the
amplicon can be accurately counted. The base composition serves
as a signature of each organism and enables identification and
discrimination of the biothreat agents and their near neighbors with
equal facility. In addition, previously undiscovered or newly
emerging organisms from within these biothreat clusters are also
detected. The database of signatures against which multiple
additional pathogens could be identified increases over time as
newer strain variants are archived and tested. An example of this
was the discovery of the 2009 H1N1 virus by the Naval Health
Research Center [7,8]; this offered the first characterization of a
previously unrecognized influenza strain, demonstrating the capa-
bility of the PLEX-ID in identification of a real-world case of novel
pathogen emergence. Because the mass spectrometer weighs all
amplicons presented to it, the amplicons from unexpected or new
organisms are detected and identified [2,5,9,10].
Using this strategy, we designed a comprehensive assay to detect
ten bacterial and four viral biothreat clusters. The assay identified
the major biothreat organisms and differentiated these from their
near neighbors and from thousands of other bacteria and viruses,
providing a seamless net of biosurveillance for these clusters in a
comprehensive biothreat assay (Figure 1). In this manuscript, we
provide a detailed description of the methodology and the results
of formal validation experiments with a variety of biothreats, near
neighbors, and specimen types. We also describe several examples
of how the assay has been used in real-world biothreat scenarios.
Results
A Comprehensive Biothreat Assay
Biothreat clusters targeted by this assay are shown in Figure 1.
These organisms make up the majority of the NIAID Category A,
B, and C priority pathogens and HHS/USDA select agents
(http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/BiodefenseRelated/Biodefense/
research/Pages/CatA.aspx). As shown in Figure 1, these biothreat
organisms are phylogenetically related to a number of other
ubiquitous organisms, making correct identification of these
organismsachallenge.Inadditiontodetectingthethreatorganisms,
the biothreat assay described here also detects virulence factors
associated with three of the agents: Bacillus anthracis (pXO1 and
pXO2), Yersinia pestis (pla and caf), and Vibrio cholera (ctx1). PCR
primers were designed to conserved regions within the selected
targetgenessuchthat thetargeted threatagentwas clearlyidentified
and differentiated from its near-neighbor species (Table 1). Many of
the primer pairs used in this assay have previously been used in
other assays on the biosensor system described here [2,3,11–16]. A
complete analysis of each biocluster and the resolution provided by
the assay is described below.
Bacillus anthracis. Bacillus anthracis, which causes anthrax in
animals and humans, is closely related to B. cereus (which causes
human food poisoning), B. thuringiensis (an insect pathogen and a
biological insecticide), and B. mycoides (considered a harmless
saprophyte). Members of the this group, known as the Bacillus cereus
clade, are environmentally ubiquitous. Classical microbiological
methods can only differentiate B. anthracis from other near-
neighbor species when the unknown isolate is shown to cause
anthrax in laboratory animal models. Classical molecular phylo-
genetic tools, such as the analysis of rRNA gene sequences, cannot
distinguish among members of the B. cereus clade.
We demonstrate here that two primer pairs, BCT352 targeting
the translation initiation factor IF-4 (infB) gene and BCT355
targeting the small acid-soluble spore protein (sspE) gene, provide
signatures that can distinguish B. anthracis from all of the near-
neighbor species within the B. cereus clade. Full virulence of B.
anthracis requires the presence of two plasmids, pXO1 and pXO2,
containing three toxin components (protective antigen, lethal
factor, and edema factor) and an anti-phagocytic capsule. The
primers used for the detection of these two plasmids (BCT2379
and BCT2381) were chosen to capture a previously described
single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) [17]. This region in each of
the plasmids provides two different alleles that can be used to
distinguish B. anthracis Ames and other Ames-like strains from non-
Ames strains. Thus, the positive identification of the B. anthracis
chromosome using the infB and sspE targets, combined with
detection of the virulence plasmid signatures, can be used to
differentiate non-pathogenic, vaccine, fully virulent, and geneti-
cally modified strains of B. anthracis.
To demonstrate the resolving capabilities of these genomic
signatures, we obtained a collection of 34 bacilli from the United
States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID). These include fully virulent, partially virulent, and
avirulent B. anthracis strains and an assortment of near-neighbor
bacilli (Table S1). Each isolate was correctly identified by
comparison of base composition signatures obtained in the
biothreat assay with genomic sequence data obtained from
GenBank (Table 2). The infB locus provided identical signatures
across all B. anthracis strains tested, whereas the sspE locus provided
two different allelic signatures. The majority of the B. anthracis
strains tested had a base composition signature of
‘‘A42G23C23T21,’’ whereas the B. anthracis strains from the
western North American region showed a SNP at this locus and
had the signature of ‘‘A41G24C23T21.’’ As predicted, the Ames-
like strains were different from the rest of the B. anthracis strains in
the pXO1 and pXO2 loci. An additional 89 strains of B. anthracis
were obtained from the Keim Genetics Lab; these strains have
various phylogenetic variations (Table S2). The diverse strains in
this collection were correctly identified in our assay. The A1.a
Molecular Identification of Biothreat Agents
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e36528clade showed the SNP pattern at the sspE locus previously
associated with the western North American lineage (Table S3).
These strains were previously reported to be distinct from other
Clade A strains as they contain a 153-bp allele in the CG3 locus
[17].
Representative strains of the B. cereus clade, including 24 B. cereus
strains and 12 B. thuringiensis strains were also tested (Table S2).
None of these carried the virulence plasmids pXO1 or pXO2 (data
not shown). Futher, the base compositions observed for the two
genomic markers showed distinct signatures compared to B.
anthracis. The amplicon for sspE showed a 6-bp deletion compared
to the B. anthracis signatures, whereas the infB signature was the
same length but had a different base composition. Based on the
combined compositions of these two primer regions, the B. cereus/
B. thuringiensis biocluster could be divided into 29 distinct
genotypes. Some of the B. thuringiensis species have individual
clusters but most are related to B. cereus species. Several studies
over the past two decades have looked at the fine structure of the
B. cereus clade and have reported similar findings [18]. Nucleic
acids from species outside the B. cereus clade, such as B. subtilis and
B. megaterium, were not amplified with the sspE primer pair. The
advantage of measuring multiple signatures across the genome and
in associated plasmids is that this provides sufficient information to
characterize the biothreat agent (i.e., vaccine vs. virulent strains of
B. anthracis) as well as distinguish it from its near-neighbors.
Yersinia pestis. The bubonic plague caused by Yersinia pestis
is a highly contagious disease that persists endemically in many
countries in the world with unpredictable resurgences [19]. Y. pestis
is classified as a biothreat agent. It is a nonmotile, capsulated,
Gram-negative bacterium transmitted to humans and susceptible
animals through flea bites or aerosols. Other species in this
biocluster include Y. enterocolitica (a diarrheagenic pathogen), Y.
frederiksenii, Y. ruckeri, and Y. pseudotuberculosis (an enteric pathogen).
Y. pseudotuberculosis exhibits more than 90% genomic homology
with Y. pestis, making much of the Y. pestis genome unsuitable for
amplification as base composition signatures do not resolve Y. pestis
and Y. pseudotuberculosis [20,21]. Two specific markers within the Y.
pestis genome were identified that provide differentiation from Y.
pseudotuberculosis. One of these is located in the valyl-tRNA
synthetase gene (valS). This region (Table 1) has a SNP that is
retained in all the Y. pestis genomes studied to date and that is
distinct from the Y. pseudotuberculosis signature for this region (Table
Figure 1. Biothreat clusters of interest. Ten bacterial and four viral clusters identified in the biothreat assay are shown. In each cluster the key
biothreat agent and its near neighbors are indicated. The HHS/USDA select agent and NIAID A, B, C pathogen lists are reflected by symbols shown in
the legend. Attenuated or live vaccine strains of some of these organisms are, however, excluded from the select agent list (http://www.selectagents.
gov/Select Agents and Toxins Exclusions.html). B. anthracis and Y. pestis plasmid markers are explicitly annotated. Organisms with names given within
brackets cannot be distinguished from each other within this assay. Primer pairs used for the detection of each biocluster are indicated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.g001
Molecular Identification of Biothreat Agents
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e36528Table 1. Biothreat cluster detection primer pair and target sites.
BW Threat Target
Primer
Pair Gene Name Forward Primer (59 –.39) Reverse Primer (59–.39)
Bacillus anthracis BCT352 Initiation factor IF-2 TTGCTCGTGGTGCACAAGTAACGGATATTA TTGCTGCTTTCGCATGGTTAATTGCTTCAA
Bacillus anthracis BCT355 endospore cytoplasmic
protein
TCAAGCAAACGCACAATCAGAAGC TTGCACGTCTGTTTCAGTTGCAAATTC
Bacillus anthracis, pXO1 BCT2381 pXO1, reverse
transcriptase
TACACAGTACTGATGGTTTTGATTTCTTAGGCT TTAGCTTTTTTGACACTTTGGTTGGATGGT
Bacillus anthracis, pXO2 BCT2379 pXO2, no gene name TGGAAGTGTAAAATGTAAAAAATGGAGTCCG TCGATTAAAGAATATGGAGATTCTTCAACGCA
Brucella melitensis serovar
abortus, melitensis, ovis, suis
BCT1111 Ribonulcease P TAAACCCCATCGGGAGCAAGACCGAATA TGCCTCGCGCAACCTACCCG
Brucella melitensis serovar
abortus, melitensis, ovis, suis
BCT1112 Ribonulcease P TACCCCAGGGAAAGTGCCACAGA TCTCTTACCCCACCCTTTCACCCTTAC
Burkholderia mallei,
pseudomallei
BCT1070 Ribonulcease P TGCGGGTAGGGAGCTTGAGC TCCGATAAGCCGGATTCTGTGC
Burkholderia mallei,
pseudomallei
BCT1071 Ribonulcease P TCCTAGAGGAATGGCTGCCACG TGCCGATAAGCCGGATTCTGTGC
Clostridium botulinum,
perfringens
BCT1075 Ribonulcease P TAAGGATAGTGCAACAGAGATATACCGCC TGCTCTTACCTCACCGTTCCACCCTTACC
Clostridium botulinum,
perfringens
BCT1076 Ribonulcease P TAAGGATAGTGCAACAGAGATATACCGCC TTTACCTCGCCTTTCCACCCTTACC
Coxiella burnetii BCT1079 Isocitrate
dehydorgenase
TCGCCGTGGAAAAATCCTACGCT TAGCCTTTTCTCCGGCGTAGATCT
Coxiella burnetii BCT1080 insertion sequence
IS1111A transposase
TCAGTATGTATCCACCGTAGCCAGTC TAAACGTCCGATACCAATGGTTCGCTC
Francisella tularensis BCT2328 Aspartate semi-
aldehyde
dehydrogenase
TGAGGGTTTTATGCTTAAAGTTGGTTTT
ATTGGTT
TGATTCGATCATACGAGACATTAAAACTGAG
Francisella tularensis BCT2332 Galactose epimerase TCAGCTAGACCTTTTAGGTAAAGCTAAGCT TCTCACCTACAGCTTTAAAGCCAGCAAAATG
Rickettsia prowazekii, typhi BCT1084 Ribonulcease P TCCACCAAGAGCAAGATCAAATAGGC TCAAGCGATCTACCCGCATTACAA
Rickettsia prowazekii, typhi BCT1083 Ribonulcease P TAAGAGCGCACCGGTAAGTTGG TCAAGCGATCTACCCGCATTACAA
Vibrio cholera BCT2323 Cholera enterotoxin
subunit A
TGCCAAGAGGACAGAGTGAGTACTTTGA TAACAAATCCCGTCTGAGTTCCTCTTGCA
Vibrio cholera BCT2927 glyceraldehyde-3-
phosphate
dehydrogenase
TCAATGAACGACCAACAAGTGATTGATG TCCTTTATGCAACTTGGTATCAACAGGAAT
Vibrio cholera BCT2012 Outer membrane
protein
TACGCTGACGGAATCAACCAAAGCGG TGCTTCAGCACGGCCACCAACTTCTAG
Yersinia pestis BCT2339 F1 Capsule antigen TCCGTTATCGCCATTGCATTATTTGGAACT TAAGAGTGATGCGGGCTGGTTCAACA
Yersinia pestis BCT2337 Plasminogen activator
precursor
TGACATCCGGCTCACGTTATTATGGTA TCCGCAAAGACTTTGGCATTAGGTGTGA
Yersinia pestis BCT2326 insertion sequence:IS200-
like and disrupted inv
TGCTGGTAACAGAGCCTTATAGGCGCA TGGGTTGCGTTGCAGATTATCTTTACCAA
E. coli O157:H7, S. enterica,
Shigella, Yersinia pestis
BCT358 Valine synthetase TCGTGGCGGCGTGGTTATCGA TCGGTACGAACTGGATGTCGCCGTT
Shigella flexneri BCT1105 invasion plasmid
antigen H
TGAGGACCGTGTCGCGCTCA TCCTTCTGATGCCTGATGGACCAGGAG
Shigella flexneri BCT1106 invasion plasmid
antigen H
TCCTTGACCGCCTTTCCGATAC TTTTCCAGCCATGCAGCGAC
Variola virus VIR985 RNA helicase NPH-II TGGAAAGTATCTCCTCCATCACTAGGAAAACC TCCCTCCCTCCCTATAACATTCAAAGCTTATTG
Variola virus VIR979 DNA helicase TGATTTCGTAGAAGTTGAACCGGGATCA TCGCGATTTTATTATCGGTCGTTGTTAATGT
Ebola virus/Marburg virus VIR853 RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase
TA/ipdU/GG/ipdU/G/ipdU/
IIIIAATGTCTTTGATTGGATGCA
TG/ipdC//ipdU/A/ipdU/
AAIIITCACTGACATGCATGTAACA
Ebola virus/Marburg virus VIR858 RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase
TTCATCAGGCATCATGGCACCA TCGGCGAGGTTGTATTTCTCTAGATCAGT
Influenza Virus VIR2798 Polymerase PB1 TGTCCTGGAATGATGATGGGCATGTT TCATCAGAGGATTGGAGTCCATCCC
Influenza Virus VIR1266 Nucleoprotein TACATCCAGATGTGCACTGAACTCAAACTCA TCGTCAAATGCAGAGAGCACCATTCTCTCTA
VEE, WEE, EEE, Chikungunya VIR966 methyltransferase TCCATGCTAATGCTAGAGCGTTTTCGCA TGGCGCACTTCCAATGTCCAGGAT
VEE, WEE, EEE, Chikungunya VIR2499 methyltransferase TGCCAGCIACAITGTGIGAICAIATGAC TGACGACTATICGCTGGTTIAGCCCIAC
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.t001
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invA, a surface-expressed protein that is reponsible for cellular
penetration and invasion. Although both Y. pseudotuberculosis and Y.
enterocolitica contain intact invasin genes, the central region of the Y.
pestis inv gene is disrupted by a 708-bp IS200-like element [22].
Primers targeting this region allow for the unambiguous detection
of Y. pestis (Table S4). In addition, Y. pestis harbors plasmids that
are required for the expression of virulence [23–26]. Primer pairs
targeted against the pla gene from the pPCP1 plasmid of Y. pestis
and the caf1 gene from the pMT1 plasmid of Y. pestis were included
in the assay to provide specific detection of virulence plasmid-
carrying Y. pestis.
Genomic data from the completely sequenced Y. pestis genomes
were used to verify the expected signatures for these primer pairs
(Table S4). All Y. pestis strains for which relevant sequence was
available in GenBank showed identical base composition signa-
tures. Partially virulent Y. pestis strains such as Y. pestis Angola
(PLA+/CAF2) and pestoides F (PLA2/CAF+) were correctly
identified. These results were further confirmed by experimental
testing a collection of seven Y. pestis strains with known phenotypes
obtained from the USAMRIID culture collection (Table S5). In
addition to the four virulent phenotypes containing PLA+/CAF+,
two strains (Nairobi and Java 9) lacking the caf gene and pestoides
F lacking the pla gene were analyzed. All of the results showed data
consistent with the expected molecular signatures. Finally, a set of
15 near neighbors of Y. pestis were tested using the assay; each was
correctly identified and differentiated from the Y. pestis signatures
(Table S6). In particular, this assay clearly distinguished the Y.
pestis signatures from those of Y. pseudotuberculosis, which is often the
confounder in molecular assays.
Francisella tularensis. The Francisella tularensis biothreat
cluster is comprised of the select agent F. tularensis and the near-
neighbor species F. philomiragia and F. novicida. F. tularensis is the
causative agent of tularemia, a disease that affects humans and
other mammals; the natural reservoir is thought to be lagamorphs
and rodents with ticks as the primary vector [27,28]. F. tularensis
has been divided into three subspecies: F. tularensis subsp. tularensis
(type A), which is divided into subtypes A.I and A.II., is the most
virulent and is found primarily in North America and Europe [29].
F. tularensis subsp. holarctica (type B) is less virulent and found in
Europe and in Asia [28], F. tularensis subsp. mediaasiatica has been
isolated only in Central Asia and is considered to be of lower
virulence [30]. The latter two subspecies can cause an incapac-
itating infection, however [30]. The near-neighbor species F.
novicida (considered by some investigators to be another subspecies
of F. tularensis) and F. philomiragia are reportedly of of low
pathogenicity and cause disease only in immunocompromised
humans [30]. Because of the potential of each of these species and
subspecies to cause disease of varying severity, it is important to
both detect and distinguish these species and subspecies.
In the biothreat assay, the Francisella biocluster is identified by
two genus-specific primer pairs targeting the asd (BCT2328) and
galE (BCT2332) genes (Table 1). Use of galE for identification of
Francisella genus has been previously described [31]. Based on
inspection of the sequence alignments for these genes of all
available Francisella sequences, both of these primer pairs are
expected to generate amplicons from all known members of the
Francisella genus. Base composition analysis of the expected
amplicons shows that Francisella species and subspecies are
distinguishable from each other (Table S7). F. tularensis base
counts are characterized by a homogenous signature for all type
A.I strains. Schu S4 is the type strain, and the rest of the Francisella
signatures are defined here as variations compared to this
reference strain. F. tularensis subsp. tularensis str. WY96-3128 (type
A.II) had a T to C SNP in the galE primer pair region. The same
signature was observed for F. tularensis subsp. mediaasiatica FSC217
strain. This is in agreement with genome-wide SNP analysis,
which indicates that differentiation of these particular strains likely
predated the acquisition of the asd or galE mutations that
characterize the subspecies. Further, the subspecies mediaasiatica
is reported to be closer to the Type A.II lineage, even though its
pathogenicity is characteristic of the Type B strains [29]. F.
tularensis subspecies novicida was distinguished by a G to A mutation
from the consensus seen in F. tularensis signature from primer pair
BCT2332.
To demonstrate the specificity of the assay for the Francisella
biocluster, we tested a collection of 57 reference isolates obtained
from the USAMRIID (Table S7). Included were members of all
phylogenetic lineages within the Francisella biocluster. Francisella
species were correctly identified and grouped into phylogenetic
clades. All 34 Type A.I subspecies yielded identical base
compositions for both primer pairs consistent with the predicted
amplicons from the Schu S4 genome. Twelve of the type B,
subspecies holarctica strains had signatures that differed from the
Type A.I subspecies in both the primer pairs, clearly differenti-
ating the two major groups of the Francisella genus. Type A.II
strain signatures were different from the Type A.I signatures by a
single T to C SNP in the galE primer amplicon, consistent with the
genome sequence of Francisella subsp. tularensis strain WY96-3128.
However, two of the Type B strains tested, FRAN041 (Strain JAP-
Cincinnati) and FRAN011 (Strain LR) could not be distinguished
from the Type A.II subspecies using these two primer pairs. As
described above, this signature appears to be consistent with subsp.
mediaasiatica strains as well. Sequence similarities between the Type
B Japanese strains, F. tularensis mediaasiatica and Type A.II lineages
were previously noted ([29], Duncan, manuscript in preparation).
The F. novicida strain (FRAN003) differed from Type A.I by a
single SNP in the galE region, whereas the species outlier, F.
philomiragia, was clearly different from the rest of the F. tularensis
biocluster in both primer regions. The asd primer pair produced
the expected amplicon for all strains of F. philomiragia. In contrast,
the galE locus primer pair did not yield an amplicon for all strains.
This region in a recently sequenced F. philomiragia strain (ATCC
25017) has mismatches to the primer regions (Genbank Accession
Number NC_010336). Even without data from the asd primer
pair, the differentiation of this species from other F. tularensis was
unambiguous. Based on the two primer analysis done here,
Francisella strains could be categorized into five groups: Types
‘‘A.I,’’ ‘‘B,’’ ‘‘novicida,’’ ‘‘philomiragia,’’ and a fifth group that
contains strains within the Type A.II/mediaasiatica/holarctica/
Japanese lineages that might have diverged before the acquisition
of the asd and galE mutations.
Vibrio cholerae. The genus Vibrio, within the family
Vibrionaceae, represents a diverse group of Gram-negative
bacteria that contain at least 65 described species, most of which
are found exclusively in aquatic environments. Of these, at least 12
species are known human pathogens, and several other species are
known to be pathogenic to marine mammals and fish. Members of
this genus include Vibrio cholerae, the causative agent of cholera.
Although large outbreaks of cholera are caused by toxigenic strains
of the serogroups O1 and O139, non-toxigenic strains cause
sporadic cases of disease. Other important pathogens in this group
include V. parahaemolyticus and V. vulnificus, which cause significant
morbidity worldwide [32].
We previously described a high-throughput pan-Vibrio assay for
simultaneous identification of all known pathogenic Vibrio species
[14]. The assay included broad-range PCR primers that targeted
conserved sites in several housekeeping genes and the V. cholerae-
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regions were able to distinguish the various species tested and
provided sub-species differentiation within the V. cholerae isolates.
For the biothreat assay, three of the primer pairs from the pan-
Vibrio assay were used (Table 1). One of these primer pairs was
exclusive to V. cholerae species detection (ompU). One amplifies the
toxin gene ctxA. The third primer pair, targeted to gapA gene, was
designed to amplify most of the known species in this family and
the resulting base compositions provide species-level resolution
(Table S8). Genomic data analysis and experimental analysis of 42
well-characterized strains representing the phylogeny of this
biocluster was used to demonstrate assay specificity.
To demonstrate the ability to detect and identify Vibrio spp.
from natural aquatic samples, a subset of samples collected in 2006
from freshwater lakes and sites along the Georgian coast of the
Black Sea were tested [14]. Six different Vibrio species were
detected and identified in 13 of the 19 natural water samples
collected from both freshwater and seawater sites spanning the
seasons summer to winter in this study [14]. More than one Vibrio
species were also detected in some samples [14]. These detections
were confirmed by 16S rRNA clone library analysis.
Burkholderia mallei/pseudomallei. The Burkholderia
biocluster is identified in the biothreat assay by two primer pairs,
BCT1070 and BCT1071 (Table 1). The primer sets amplify
conserved regions of the RNA component of ribonuclease P
(RNAse P) and regions CR-IV and CR-V that bracket the highly
variable extension P19. These primer pairs have homology to this
gene from other proteobacteria; however, the length and base
composition of the resulting amplicons are highly discriminating.
The information content within amplicons from BCT1070 and
BCT1071 is basically the same, and this feature is meant as a built-
in redundancy check for speciation calls. Some B. pseudomallei
strains provide the same signature as B. mallei (Table S9), but the
next closest relative, B. thailandensis, is clearly segregated. Analysis
of known sequences indicates that the assay will resolve most
known Burkholderia species (with members of the B. cepacia
biocluster being further distinguished through their distinct
amplicon lengths. A notable exception is the polychlorinated
biphenyl reducer B. xenovorans, which shows the same mass
signature as B. pseudomallei str. 668. While this is a source of
potential false positive reporting of B. pseudomallei, the occurrence
of B. xenovorans, which occupies a distinct ecological niche and is not
pathogenic, is quite rare.
Brucella. Several extremely dangerous pathogens that can
infect humans and animals are found in the Brucella biocluster.
These bacteria are easily transmitted by ingestion of unsterilized
milk or meat from infected animals or close contact with their
secretions or by inhalation of aerosols. Brucella species have slightly
different preferred host specificities: B. melitensis infects goats and
sheep, B. abortus infects cattle, B. suis infects pigs, B. ovis infects
sheep, B. canis infects dogs, and B. neotomae infects wood rats.
Taxonomists have alternated between individual species naming
and naming as a single species B. melitensis, containing B. melitensis
16M and five other biovars: abortus, canis, neotomae, ovis, and suis.
Recently, four additional species of Brucella have been described,
including two that infect marine mammals. The current conven-
tion adopted by the International Committee on Systematics of
Prokaryotes, subcommittee on Brucella (http://www.the-icsp.org/
subcoms/Brucella.htm) recommends re-approval of the classical
Brucella species with their recognized biovars.
In the biothreat assay, members of the Brucella biocluster are
identified by two primer pairs, BCT1111 and BCT1112, that
amplify two non-overlapping regions of the RNA component of
ribonuclease P gene (Table 1). These two regions were chosen for
their ability to amplify all Brucella species and to distinguish these
from other near-neighbor Alphaproteobacteria species. Table S10
shows the base compositions expected from the two Brucella primer
pairs used in the assay; signatures were derived from GenBank
data for the sequenced Brucella species.
Clostridium botulinum/perfringens. The genus Clostridi-
um consists of relatively large, Gram-positive, rod-shaped bacteria
in the phylum Firmicutes. Most clostridia are opportunistic
pathogens that are anaerobic, but spores are able to survive long
periods of exposure to air. Most of the clostridia are saprophytes,
but a few are pathogenic in humans, primarily Clostridium botulinum,
C. perfringens, C. difficile, and C. tetani. Botulism is an acute
neurological disease caused by a neurotoxin produced by C.
botulinum. Eight C. botulinum neurotoxin types have been identified:
types A, B, C1, C2, D, E, F, and G [33,34]. Types A, B, E, and F
cause human botulism. Types C and D cause most cases of
botulism in animals. C. perfringens is classified into five types on the
basis of its ability to produce one or more of the major lethal
toxins, alpha, beta, epsilon, and iota. C. tetani is another
clostridium that can be highly toxigenic to humans. Other
clostridia can be highly invasive under certain circumstances.
In the biothreat assay, the clostridia are identified using two
primer pairs, BCT1075 and BCT1076, targeting RNase P. These
two primer pairs are capable of amplifying all members of the
genus Clostridium and differentiate the major species (Table S11).
The C. botulinum strains form three base composition clusters,
differing from each other by one or more SNPs in each of the two
amplified regions. Types A, B1, and F form a unique group and
are distinguishable from all other clostridia. The second group
consists of types A2, A3, and Ba4 have base compositions that
overlap with C. sporogenes. The third C. botulinum group comprises
types B and E and some strains of C. perfringens as well as the
recently sequenced C. ljungdahlii. Most strains of C. tetani and the
opportunistic clinical pathogen C. difficile form unique groups.
Other clostridia that are rarely human pathogens are clearly
differentiated from all the above, thus providing a rapid means of
detection of the pathogenic clostridia.
Coxiella burnetii. Q fever is a zoonosis caused by Coxiella
burnetii, an obligate Gram-negative intracellular bacterium [35]. C.
burnetii infects various hosts, including humans, ruminants, and
pets. Because of its highly infectious nature, C. burnetii is recognized
as a biothreat agent. The bacterium can exist in a spore-like life
cycle and remain viable and virulent for many months.
Phylogenetically it occupies a unique niche, with very few near
neighbors. The closest known organism based on genomic and
16S rRNA analysis is Legionella pneumophila [36].
In the biothreat assay, we use primers targeting isocitrate
dehydrogenase (icd) and insertion sequence IS1111A transposase
for unambiguous detection of C. burnetii (BCT1079 and BCT1080,
respectively). The latter occurs in multiple copies in the bacterium
(from 5 to 31 copies) [35,37]. Base composition analysis of the
expected products showed that all sequenced Coxiella genomes
(NM, Dugway, K, and Q) share identical signatures in both
amplified regions (Table S12). These primer pairs do not amplify
Legionella (data not shown) and should not amplify nucleic acids
from any of the other proteobacteria. The C. burnetii G (Q212)
sequenced genome showed two different base counts at the
IS111A locus, suggesting a SNP variant in this region, similar to
operonic diversities often seen in 16S rRNA sequences for other
bacteria.
Rickettsia prowazekii. The Rickettsiaceae are a family of
obligate intracellular small Gram-negative coccobacilli that infect
humans chiefly through insect vectors, mostly from animal hosts
[38]. The rickettsial fevers are acute bacteremic illnesses charac-
Molecular Identification of Biothreat Agents
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e36528terized by headache, mental confusion, and, in severe cases,
meningoencephalitis. The genus Rickettsia is divided into three
main groups: R. prowazekii, the agent of classical epidemic typhus;
R. typhi, the causal agent of endemic typhus; and the ‘‘spotted
fever’’ group of rickettsiae, which contains a large number of
species transmitted from rodents, dogs, and wild animals by ticks.
The latter group includes R. rickettsii, the agent of Rocky Mountain
spotted fever; R. conorii, the cause of tick typhus in the
Mediterranean area and in India; R. africae, which is found in
the African veld; R. japonica, R. australis, and a variety of other
similar organisms that are widely distributed in Asia and Australia.
Organisms in the Rickettsia biocluster are identified by two
primer pairs, BCT1083 and BCT1084, which prime different
regions of the RNA component of the RNase P. Since the primers
target Rickettsia-specific sequences, no amplification is expected
outside the Rickettsiaceae family. Using these two primer pairs,
members of the Rickettsia biocluster can be distinguished from
each other. In particular, R. prowazekii, R. typhi, and R. rickettsii
species yield distinct PLEX-ID base composition clusters (Table
S13).
Enterobacteriaceae (Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella,
Salmonella enterica). Diarrheagenic enterobacteria, such as
E. coli, Salmonella, and Shigella species, are closely related organisms
that are ubiquitous food and water-borne pathogens. These agents
have the potential to cause significant damage to the food supply
and are high-risk clinical pathogens. There are over 3,500
Salmonella subtypes, and all are human pathogens. The majority
of these serotypes belong to a single Salmonella species, Salmonella
enterica, which includes six subspecies (subsp. enterica, subsp. salamae,
subsp. arizonae, subsp. diarizonae, subsp. houtenae, and subspecies
indica). For Shigella, there are four species (Shigella dysenteriae, S.
flexneri, S. boydii, and S. sonnei); all can cause enteric illnesses. There
are at least five pathotypes of E. coli: enteroinvasive E. coli (EIEC),
enterotoxigenic E. coli (ETEC), enteropathogenic E. coli (EPEC),
enterohemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC), and enteroaggregative E. coli
(EAEC). Symptoms caused by these organisms are often similar,
and these organisms are difficult to differentiate by genomic
analysis.
In the biothreat assay, a primer pair targeting the valine
synthetase (BCT358) gene provides identification of all of the
above species in the Enterobacteriaceae family. In addition, this
primer pair also provides species resolution of Yersinia as discussed
previously. The base count clusters shown in Table S14
demonstrate the ability of this primer pair to amplify members
of the family Enterobacteriaceae and to provide species-level
differentiation of Salmonella from E. coli and Shigella, although the
Shigella species base counts are indistinguishable from a group of
the E. coli strains using this primer pair (PLEX-ID cluster 5, Table
S14). This is consistent with the previously described phylogenetic
relationship of these bacteria [39]. Importantly, the pathogenic
E. coli O157:H7 species is clearly differentiated from all other
Enterobacteriaceae except enteropathogenic E. coli O55:H7, strain
5905 (BC cluster 1). This strain is considered the immediate
ancestor of the E. coli O157:H7 lineage and contains the shiga
toxin, which is atypical for other E. coli O55:H7 strains [40]. The
Salmonella species are divided into several clusters, but cannot be
grouped according to the subspecies nomenclature based on data
from this assay. These pathogens can be resolved in a more
targeted food-borne bacteria assay (manuscript in preparation).
In order to provide additional separation between E. coli and
Shigella species, we added two more primer pairs targeting two
different regions of invasion plasmid antigen H (ipaH). As shown in
Table S15, these two primer pairs amplify all Shigella species but do
not amplify E. coli or Salmonella (data not shown). Thus, the four
major Shigella species can be clearly identified as a group distinct
from E. coli using information from the three primer pairs. This
assay, however, does not distinguish among the various Shigella
species.
Alphaviruses. The genus Alphavirus, of the family Togavir-
idae, contains at least 37 species and subtypes or varieties and at
least 23 have been associated with human illness. Some New
World Alphavirus, such as the eastern equine encephalitis viruses
(EEEV) and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV)
complex, are considered potential bioweapons [41]. Other
important members of this virus group include the western equine
encephalitis virus (WEEV) complex viruses that include Sindbis
virus. The Old World cluster includes Chikungunya virus and
Semiliki Forest virus complex among others. We have previously
described an assay for pan-Alphavirus detection and demonstrated
the utility of this with field-collected mosquito and clinical samples
[12]. This assay detects a wide variety of Alphavirus in naturally
occurring biological backgrounds and was used to identify a virus
that was a novel subtype IIID in the VEEV complex [12]. Two of
the three primer pairs described previously were used in the
biothreat assay and have been tested against a broad panel
Alphavirus isolates representing both the Old World and New
World Alphavirus (Table S16). Both are targeted to the NS1 region
on the 59-end of Alphavirus genome. Primer pair VIR966
exhibited the greatest breadth of coverage. Base counts from this
primer pair amplicon alone were sufficient to distinguish most of
the isolates at the species and strain level. The second primer pair
(VIR2499) used in the study contains inosine (I) nucleotides at
selected sites in both the forward and reverse primers to enhance
hybridization, but despite this, did not amplify several of the Old
World Alphavirus. All the Alphavirus samples tested were detected
with at least the VIR966 pair and most were identified to strain or
subtype level.
Orthopoxvirus. The genus Orthopoxvirus contains several
species of related viruses including the causative agent of smallpox
(Variola virus). In addition to smallpox, several other members of
the genus are capable of causing human infection, including
monkeypox, cowpox, and other zoonotic rodent-borne poxviruses.
We have previously described a pan-Orthopoxvirus assay for
identification of all members of the genus based on four PCR
reactions targeting Orthopoxvirus DNA and RNA helicase and
polymerase genes. The assay can detect and identify diverse
orthopoxviruses, provide sub-species information, and character-
ize viruses from the blood of rabbitpox virus-infected rabbits [11].
In the biothreat assay, we used two of these four primer pairs
(VIR979 and VIR985). The two provide species-level resolution of
the genus Orthopoxvirus and, in particular, differentiate the Variola
and monkeypox viruses from each other and from vaccinia,
rabbitpox, and ectromelia viruses (Table S17).
Influenza virus. Influenza A viruses are important respira-
tory pathogens that cause annual epidemics and occasional
pandemics. Influenza viruses cause serious global economic and
public health burdens. Emergence of new influenza A virus strains
can be caused by ‘‘antigenic shift,’’ resulting from reassortment of
gene segments (including H and/or N types), by ‘‘antigenic drift’’
resulting from the continuing accumulation of mutations in the H
and N genes, or by species jump by a virus that acquires the ability
to infect and be transmitted among humans as has happened in
the influenza pandemics over the last century [42,43]. In April
2009, a previously unseen virus emerged and rapidly spread
globally leading to the first influenza pandemic of the 21
st century.
The continuous evolution of influenza genomes together with
reassortment events pose challenges to the effective monitoring of
influenza viruses. We previously described an RT-PCR/ESI-MS
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[8,10,15,16,44,45]. Identification of each influenza A virus is
based on the summation of base composition signatures obtained
from the six to eight primer pairs.
In the biothreat assay, two of the previously described sets of
primer pairs (VIR2798 and VIR1266) were included for rapid
detection of presence of influenza A or B virus. Base composition
data from the amplified regions of over a 1000 influenza A H5N1
strains from GenBank were analyzed. The majority of these could
be grouped into the six base composition clusters as shown in
Table S18. These clusters were unique and distinct from other
avian and non-avian signatures (data not shown), with the
exception of two instances of avian H9N2 sharing base compo-
sition overlap with one or more of the avian H5N1 clusters. In
both these instances, however, all the overlapping strains were
from local outbreaks (Shantou 2003 and Guangxi 2006) and were
not widely distributed. Similar correlations were found for
pandemic 2009 H1N1, seasonal H3N2, and seasonal H1N1
viruses as previously described [44]. In the biothreat assay, the
non-avian H5N1 subtypes will be reported only at the species level
as influenza A virus. Further differentiation of the sub-species may
be achieved using the broader PCR/ESI-MS influenza assay
previously described [13].
Filovirus. Filoviridae is a viral family of negative-strand RNA
viruses that include two major genera, Ebolavirus and Marburgvirus,
both of which contain highly pathogenic and potential biowarfare
agents. Some of the species in these groups include Sudan, Reston,
Zaire, and Cote d’Ivoire ebolavirus and several strain variants of
the Lake Victoria marburgvirus species. We have developed an
assay for the detection of all members of this family using two
primer pairs targeting the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase
region of the genome. There is significant sequence diversity
among the filoviruses and in order to ensure primer hybridization
to all the above viruses, we used modified nucleotides in the PCR
primer pairs as previously described for the detection of the SARS
coronavirus [9]. We tested these primers with samples obtained
from the CDC Special Pathogens Branch (Dr. Stuart Nichol,
personal communication). In all cases, we obtained the base
composition signatures expected based on sequenced genomes of
these viruses (Table S19). Due to the highly pathogenic nature of
these viruses, these viruses were not used in any additional
analytical characterization studies described below.
Data Analysis and Reporting
The above sections describe in detail the primer pairs used in
the biothreat assay and the ability of the individual groups of
primer pairs to detect the targeted biothreat cluster. All of these
primer pairs were assembled into a single assay kit containing
groups of two to three primer pairs per well for screening for all
the listed biothreat agents simultaneously. The assay layout is
shown in Figure S1. Sixteen wells of a 96-well microtiter plate
were utilized for analysis of each sample. Up to six samples may be
screened per plate. Importantly, each PCR well included a
synthetic DNA calibrant that was amplified by one of the target
primer pairs. This calibrant served as a PCR positive control and
allowed relative determination of the quantity of the target
organism as previously described [2,4].
Data analysis and reporting for this assay were optimized for
detecting the targeted biothreat clusters, and detection of
organisms outside this group are not reported. Two different
types of report are currently available. The first is a summary that
reports detection and lack thereof for each of the 14 groups
described in the previous sections for each sample (Figure S2). The
criteria for inclusion in this report are the detection of the
biothreat cluster organisms in one or more primer pairs targeting
the individual clusters. The primer pairs targeting the plasmid
markers are reported separately. In the specific example shown,
the test organism was a B. anthracis strain containing both virulence
plasmids. The report indicates detection of the genome and the
two plasmids. The approximate genome equivalents per well for
the target organism are based on relative amplification compared
to the calibrant. At higher target organism concentrations, the
calibrant is often outcompeted in the PCR well; therefore, the
reported levels at higher loads could be inaccurate. Another more
in-depth analysis of the data is available that provides base
composition details to support the calls reported in the summary
(Figure S3).
Analytical Performance Characteristics
Analytic sensitivity. The limit of detection (LOD) of the
biothreat assay in analysis of environmental aerosol samples, one
of its intended uses, was determined by analyzing serial 10-fold
dilutions of nucleic acids from a number of test agents with air
filter nucleic acid extract from a biodefense monitoring program
(‘‘Dirty Air’’). In parallel, samples were also tested in DNA elution
buffer (TE buffer) alone. Fivefold serial dilutions of nucleic acid
samples (with a high concentration of 1000 GE/well for all targets
except VEEV which was 5000 GE/well) of the nucleic acid
extracts from all the target organisms were prepared and 10
replicates of each dilution of each agent were analyzed. The
presumptive LOD was ascribed to be the lowest concentration
resulting in 10 correct identifications and detections in all primer
pairs targeting each biothreat cluster (Figure S4). Additional
replicates were analyzed (as many as 105) to allow for sufficient
data to determine the LOD with a 95% confidence interval. These
measured LODs were used for subsequent analysis. Nucleic acids
from test organisms were paired to reduce overall sample numbers
(for example, B. anthracis and vaccinia virus nucleic acids were
spiked together and analyzed in the same sample). These LOD
studies were preceded by analysis of synthetic constructs, plasmids
containing DNA sequences similar to those of the biothreat agents.
These constructs were carefully measured using real-time PCR
assays targeting the plasmid backbone (data not shown). Using this
synthetic approach, the LOD for the various target primer pairs in
the biothreat assay were determined to be between 7 and 250
genome equivalents (GE) per well, with most organisms detected at
between 15 and 62.5 GE/well (Figure S4). The outliers were the
three RNA virus groups, which showed either 125 or 250 GE/well
LOD.
The LODs and the false negative rates for all threat agents
tested are summarized in Table 3. The LOD for the threat agents
tested in the context of environmental air background ranged from
40 to 1000 GE/well. It was found that 37.5% (6/16) of the threat
agents tested had LODs of 40 GE/well, 50% (8/16) had LODs of
200 GE/well, and 12.5% (2/16) had LODs of 1000 GE/well. At
the LODs, false negative rates were less than 5% for 14 of the
agents used to challenge the biothreat assay kit and less than 10%
for two of the agents. Detection and identification of all the threat
agents relies on more than one primer pair; in the case of B.
anthracis, it relies on four primer pairs. For calculation of LOD, all
targeted primer pairs were expected to amplify and produce
results. However, in routine operation, any primer pair producing
a result would result in an organism identification. The false
negative rates were calculated based on a failure to detect the
threat organism.
Specificity. It is critical that an assay used for biodefense
monitoring be capable of detecting threats and, perhaps as
importantly, of not falsely identifying a threat. The sample
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programs result in samples containing significant amounts of nucleic
acids from a variety of species. Two methods were employed to
determine the specificity of the biothreat assay. First, over 1000
samples containing environmental background without a specific
target agent were analyzed and used to calculate false positive rates
for each agent. Second, the ability of the biothreat assay kitto detect a
threat when the sample contained both the targeted threat and a near
neighbor but not when the sample contained only the near neighbor
was assessed.
A total of 1,353 samples in an environmental air background
were analyzed during the determination of sensitivity. Each of
these samples contained only two of the agents under investiga-
tion. Because the biothreat assay simultaneously analyzes each
sample for every threat agent, the results from those samples not
containing a particular threat agent were used to determine the
false positive rates of that agent. For example, in the LOD
determination of B. anthracis, the sample contained nucleic acids
extracted from the environmental collection and from B. anthracis
and vaccinia virus. Because those samples did not contain any of
the other 14 threat agents, the data from the analysis of those
samples could be used to calculate the false positive rate. The false
positive rates for each of the threat agents tested was 0%, except
for Rickettsia prowazekii, which was 14% (Table 4). The matrix that
was used as background had high loads of environmental bacterial
signatures (data not shown), including alphaproteobacteria such as
Rickettsia and Mesorhizobium species. These might account for the
observed higher false positive rates for rickettsial species compared
to other organisms. Higher background prevalence of some of the
potential biothreat agents or their near neighbors in certain
regions of the world might similarly affect other detections. For
instance, Burkholderia pseudomallei, which is described as a highly
distributed soil saprophyte in southeast Asia would result in higher
rates of reporting of this organism.
Near-neighbor nucleic acids were added to the sample in excess
(fivefold higher than the LOD) of the target biothreat nucleic acids
(added at twofold the LOD). The results are presented in Table 5.
For each of the threat agents tested, the threat organism was
correctly identified by the PLEX-ID system even when excess
near-neighbor nucleic acids were present in the sample. As
expected for the Brucella melitensis cluster, the PLEX-ID biothreat
assay did not discriminate between B. melitensis, B. abortus, B. suis,
and B. ovis, which are all considered to be potential threat
organisms. When Rickettsia canadensis was included during testing of
the Rickettsial primer pairs, Coxiella burnetii was also identified as a
false positive. This detection was reported by the Coxiella primer
pairs, not the rickettsial primer pairs, indicating that there was a
possible contamination of the R. canadensis with Coxiella burnettii.
Thus, the PLEX-ID clearly demonstrated the ability to detect
threat agents in the presence of both background and excess near-
neighbor nucleic acids.
Breadth of coverage. To determine the ability of the
biothreat assay to distinguish between threat agents and near
neighbors, the biothreat assay was challenged with nucleic acids
purified from a panel of organisms. These samples were diluted in
Tris-EDTA (pH 8.0) to allow for analysis on the biothreat assay
plate at 1000 GE/well for each organism individually. In every
case, the challenge organism was correctly identified. When
possible, additional strains or sub-species were also identified.
However, the intended use of the biothreat assay is to alarm the
end user when a threat is present. The data presented in Table 6
clearly demonstrate the ability of the assay and the instrument to
discriminate between threat agents and near neighbors.
Linearity. The ability of an instrument to provide measure-
ments that are directly proportional to the concentration of the test
analyte is referred to as linearity. Data obtained from experiments
used to determine the LOD within an environmental matrix were
analyzed for linearity. The total GE reported by the PLEX-ID was
plotted against the actual concentration; linear trend lines were
generated to determine linearity within the challenge concentra-
tions. Figure 2 shows results for B. anthracis linearity test,
demonstrating linearity for the entire range of concentrations
tested. Other organisms were linear up to the maximum
concentration tested. The data are summarized in Table 7.
Table 3. Limits of detection and false negative rates.
Threat GE/well
Percent
complete Correct
False Negative
Rate
UL (95%
Confidence)
Bacillus anthracis 200 98% 104/109 4.6% 9.3%
Brucella melitensis 1000 100% 93/96 3.1% 7.8%
Burkholderia mallei 200 100% 96/97 1% 4.9%
Clostridium botulinum 40 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
Clostridium perfringens 200 100% 94/96 3.1% 6.4%
Coxiella burnetii 200 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
E. coli O157:H7 200 100% 89/96 7.3% 13.1%
Francisella tularensis 40 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
Vaccinia virus 200 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
Rickettsia prowazekii 1000 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
Salmonella enterica 40 100% 95/96 1% 4.9%
Shigella flexneri 200 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
VEE 200 100% 96/96 0% 3.3%
Vibrio cholerae 40 100% 95/97 2% 6.3%
Y. pestis 40 100% 95/96 1% 4.9%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.t003
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The biothreat assay described here identifies ten bacterial and
four viral biothreat clusters included in the NIAID priority
pathogen (Category A: seven agents, Category B: 18; Category C:
three) and HHS/USDA select agent (18 agents) lists. The assay
also identifies a broad range of near-neighbor organisms that may
cause severe disease in humans or animals or that may be harmless
environmental organisms. The biothreat cluster analysis strategy
using PCR/ESI-MS addresses several fundamental design re-
quirements for biothreat protection. First, biothreat agents and
near-neighbor organisms are identified unambiguously and
equally. Closely related organisms often cause false alarms in
conventional PCR approaches to detect biothreat agents. Perhaps
more importantly, it enables identification of unexpected patho-
gens within the biothreat clusters that might be used in a biological
attack. Second, the genetic targets for amplification in the
biothreat assay are universally conserved, essential to microbial
life. This lowers the risk of failed detections because these targets
cannot be dispensed with by the microbe and would be difficult to
modify by engineering to avoid detection. Third, the comprehen-
sive nature of the biothreat assay enables very broad surveillance
of the potential biothreat landscape, including the detection of the
virulence plasmids where appropriate. Fourth, the PCR/ESI-MS
instrumentation enables very high-throughput sample analysis; the
theoretical maximum throughput of the biothreat assay on a
current-generation PLEX-ID instrument is approximately 180
specimens over 24 hours.
Some of the component primer pairs of the comprehensive
biothreat assay were validated before the biothreat assay was
assembled. The Orthopoxvirus primers have been shown to detect
and identify a diverse collection of over 30 isolates of orthopox-
viruses and to identify sub-species and characterize viruses from
the blood of rabbitpox-infected rabbits [11]. The Alphavirus
primers were used to amplify a panel of 36 virus isolates
representing characterized Old World and New World Alphavirus
[12]. Base compositions from the resulting amplicons were used to
unambiguously determine the species or subtypes of 35 of the
isolates. In addition, the assay was used to identify Alphavirus
directly in mosquitoes and detected an unanticipated Mucambo
virus species [12].
The Francisella biocluster primers were used in an investigation
to understand why the U.S. Government Biowatch sensors were
triggered by an apparent false alarm on September 24–25, 2005
during a large public gathering along the Capital Mall area in
Washington, DC. The sensors signaled low-level detections of F.
tularensis. Uncertainty as to whether or not there was a biological
attack led the CDC to issue an official national health advisory via
the health alert network to alert healthcare personnel to possible
tularemia exposure (CDCHAN-00238-05-09-30-ADV-N). Speci-
mens analyzed by the primer pairs that comprise the F. tularensis
biothreat cluster component of the biothreat assay were used to
analyze the air specimens. The results showed that the base
composition signature in the extracted air samples had the
signature of F. tularensis subsp. novicida, a naturally occurring
organism with significantly lower virulence than F. tularensis subsp.
tularensis, the main bioagent in the cluster [46]. Thus the detections
of F. tularensis observed in these air samples most likely represented
detection of a naturally occurring organism. The biothreat assay
described here would immediately identify this organism as a near
neighbor of a biothreat agent.
The V. cholerae biocluster primers were previously field-tested
using natural water samples from both freshwater lakes and the
Georgian coastal zone of the Black Sea. Of the 278 total water
samples screened, nine different Vibrio species were detected, 114
samples were positive for V. cholerae, and five samples were positive
for the cholera toxin A gene (ctxA) [14]. The results were
confirmed with conventional PCR.
The Y. pestis primers were used to identify the first reported case
of plague in Afghanistan where the illness is associated with
consumption of camel meat [47]. In late December 2007, an
outbreak of acute gastroenteritis occurred in Nimroz Province of
southern Afghanistan. Of the 83 patients, 17 died. Molecular
testing of patient clinical samples and of tissue from the camel
using PCR/ESI-MS revealed DNA signatures consistent with Y.
pestis. Confirmatory testing using real-time PCR and immunolog-
ical seroconversion of one of the patients confirmed that the
outbreak was caused by plague with a rare gastrointestinal
presentation.
Assembly of this comprehensive collection of biothreat cluster
primers into a single assay on the PLEX-ID has the potential to
serve a variety of biosecurity needs. First, the biothreat assay can
be used for environmental surveillance 2 the application that was
experimentally demonstrated in this manuscript. Another potential
use of the assay is as a reflex test to the pan-bacterial PLEX-ID
assay intended to identify all bacteria in normally sterile bodily
fluids (e.g., blood, cerebral spinal fluid) [6]. In this concept of
operation, the pan-bacterial assay would be used routinely in
clinical diagnostics and, if potential biothreat agents were detected,
the biothreat assay would be used to provide detailed analysis.
Although several of the primer pairs used in this assay were
studied previously, the biothreat assay is a multiplexed version:
Thirty-six primer pairs are combined into 16 PCR reactions. The
multiplexed assay was tested with environmental air from
Biowatch filters. Feasibility studies were performed at 1000 GE
of each target organism spiked into background matrix. The
environmental background did not inhibit the ability of PLEX-ID
to correctly detect the target organisms. Additional studies were
conducted to demonstrate the analytical performance of the assay.
These included sensitivity, specificity, linearity, and breadth of
Table 4. Specificity of the biothreat assay measured as false
positive rates.
Threat Detection
False Positive
Rates
UL (95%
Confidence)
Bacillus anthracis 0/1192 0% 0%
Francisella tularensis 0/1206 0% 0%
Yersinia pestis 0/1198 0% 0%
Vaccinia Virus 1/1198 0% 0%
Brucella melitensis 0/1203 0% 0%
Vibrio cholerae 0/1135 0% 0%
Burkholderia mallei 0/1205 0% 0%
Salmonella enterica 0/1209 0% 0%
VEE 0/1169 0% 0%
E. coli O157:H7 0/1182 0% 0%
Influenza A virus 0/1270 0% 0%
Clostridium perfringens 0/1170 0% 0%
Clostridium botulinum 0/1207 0% 0%
Shigella flexneri 0/1157 0% 0%
Coxiella burnetii 0/1205 0% 0%
Rickettsia prowazekii 167/1193 14%* 13.9%*
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.t004
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target organisms varied between 40–1000 GE/well with no false
positive detections, and false negative rates below 5% for most
organisms tested. The matrix that was used as background had
high loads of environmental bacterial signatures (data not shown),
including alphaproteobacteria such as Rickettsia and Mesorhizobium
species. These might account for the observed higher false positive
rates for rickettsial species compared to other organisms. Breadth
of coverage and specificity for detection of biothreat agents were
determined with Critical Reagents Program (CRP; http://www.
jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs/Default.aspx?pg=1205) reagents. There
was an excellent correlation between PLEX-ID identifications
and the identity of the spiked strains. Presence of two- to five- fold
excess of a near-neighbor organism did not interfere with the
detection of the biothreat agent. PLEX-ID assays in general are
semi-quantitative at best and have a limited dynamic range for
reporting genome levels of detected organisms [4]. The levels of
organisms determined using the biothreat assay indicate the
approximate genome equivalents/well for the target organism
based on relative amplification compared to the calibrant. At
higher target organism concentrations, the calibrant is often
outcompeted in the PCR reaction, therefore the reported levels at
the higher loads were inaccurate. This, however, does not interfere
with the ability of the assay to detect the threat agent. In contrast,
a specific RT-PCR assay targeting a single organism might be able
to provide a measurement over a much larger linear range.
In summary, the PLEX-ID Biothreat Assay kit was evaluated
for detection of biothreat agents in environmental air samples. The
data presented demonstrate the capability of the PCR/ESI-MS
method to accurately detect and identify organisms from ten
bacterial and four viral biothreat clusters. The assay discriminated
between target agent and near neighbors with high specificity and
sensitivity. The method accurately reported each organism with
which it was challenged and accurately identified threat species as
a threat; species and/or strains that are not considered a threat
were not reported as such. The assay is capable of simultaneous
detection of most NIAID Category A, B, and C priority pathogens
and HHS/USDA select agents and thus provides a means for
Table 5. Specificity of the biothreat assay as measure by near-neighbor challenge.
Spiked nucleic acid extracts (Concentration)
Type: Biothreat (BT) or
Near Neighbor (NN) Organisms identified
Bacillus anthracis (400 GE/well) BT Bacillus anthracis
Bacillus thuringiensis (1000 GE/well) NN Bacillus thuringiensis/cereus
1
Brucella melitensis (2000 GE/well) BT Brucella melitensis/abortus/suis/ovis
2
Brucella abortus (5000 GE/well) BT
Burkholderia mallei (400 GE/well) BT Burkholderia mallei/pseudomallei
Burkholderia cepaciae (1000 GE/well) NN B. cepacia/cenocepacia/Burkholderia sp. 383
Clostridium botulinum (400 GE/well) BT Clostridium botulinum/sporogenes
Clostridium difficile (1000 GE/well) NN
Clostridium perfringens (400 GE/well) BT Clostridium perfringens
3
Clostridium difficile (1000 GE/well) NN
Coxiella burnetii (400 GE/well) BT Coxiella burnetii
3
Legionella pneumophila (1000 GE/well) NN
Francisella tularensis (400 GE/well) BT Francisella tularensis
3
Francisella philomiragia (1000 GE/well) NN
Rickettsia prowazekii (2000 GE/well) BT Rickettsia prowazekii
Rickettsia canadensis (5000 GE/well) NN Rickettsia Canadensis
Coxiella burnetii
4
Vibrio cholera (80 GE/well) BT Vibrio cholera
3
Vibrio vulnificus (200 GE/well) NN
Y. pestis (80 GE/well) BT Y. pestis
3
Y. frederiksenii (200 GE/well) NN
Escherichia coli O157:H7 (400 GE/well) BT Escherichia coli O157:H7/E. coli
Klebsiella pneumoniae (1000 GE/well) NN Klebsiella pneumoniae/ozaenae
Shigella flexneri (400 GE/well) BT Shigella flexneri/dysenteriae/boydii/sonnei
Klebsiella pneumonia (1000 GE/well) NN Multiple Klebsiella sp
Multiple Escherichia sp
Salmonella enterica (80 GE/well) BT Salmonella enterica/salamae
3
Klebsiella pneumonia (200 GE/well) NN
1Indicates inability to differentiate the species further.
2Brucella is identified at the genus level in this assay.
3Near-neighbor organism not detected.
4C. burnettii detected by Coxiella primer pairs; potentially contaminated R. Canadensis stock.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.t005
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validation data support use of the Ibis PLEX-ID and the biothreat
assay for detection of biological warfare agents in complex
environmental matrices. Additional testing of this assay with an
EU validation panel is described in a companion manuscript
(Grunow et al. [49]).
Materials and Methods
Sample Preparation
The nucleic acid samples used in this study were obtained
from the Critical Reagents Program (CRP), BEI Resources,
ATCC, Keim Genetics Lab, or were prepared from MRI culture
collections. Environmental collections were obtained on dry
filter unit (DFU) filters from a variety of locations in the
Washington, D.C. region. Nucleic acids were eluted from the
environmental matrix by placing DFUs in 20 ml PBS/0.2%
Triton X-200 and manually shaking. The eluent was then shaken
in a Biospec Mini BeadBeater-96 with ATL buffer (Qiagen),
Herring Sperm DNA, Proteinase K, and antifoam for 5 min.
Samples were incubated for 21 min at 16uC and then centrifuged.
AL buffer (Qiagen) was added to the supernatants and incubated
for 1 min at 70uC. Ethanol was added to the sample, which was
then loaded onto a Qiagen spin column, centrifuged, and
sequentially washed with AL, AW2, and AW4 buffers (Qiagen).
The sample was eluted from the spin columns in 200 mlo fA E
buffer (Qiagen).
Assay Design
The primer pairs that make up the biothreat assay (Table 1)
were selected to provide the desired resolving capability for the
assay as described in detail in the Results section. Thirty-six primer
pairs were used in the assay; primer pairs were grouped two to
three per well to occupy 16 wells of a 96-well microtiter plate. The
groupings were chosen to eliminate primer interactions and target
overlap. The assay layout is shown in Figure S1. Each assay plate
can be used to screen up to six samples.
PCR and RT-PCR
Internal positive controls similar to the amplicon expected from
one of the primer pairs in each of the multiplexed reactions were
made from cloned synthetic DNA (BlueHeron Biotechnology,
Bothell, WA) and were included in each PCR reaction at 100
copies per reaction. The internal controls were designed to be
identical to the expected target priming regions with the exception
of five-base pair deletions to enable the control to be distinguished
from the target-derived amplicon. PCR was performed in a 50 mL
reaction volume containing 5 mL nucleic acid extract in a reaction
mix as previously described [48]. The plate was heat-sealed with
foil on a Thermo Scientific ALPS microplate heat sealer (Rock-
ford, IL). Each sealed plate was loaded onto a Mastercycler Pro
thermocycler (Eppendorf, Hauppauge, NY) and PCR-amplified
under the following conditions: 95uC for 10 min; then 8 cycles of
95uC for 30 s, 48uC for 30 s, and 72uC for 30 s; then 37 cycles of
95uC for 15 s, 56uC for 20 s, and 72uC for 20 s; followed by 72uC
for 2 min, and 99uC for 20 min. One-step RT-PCR was
performed in wells with primers designed for viral detection.
Since all reactions for a sample were run in the same 96-well plate
RT-PCR cycling conditions were used for both the RT-PCR and
PCR reactions as previously described [12].
Target Detection
After thermocycling, plates were stored at 240uC until the
samples could be analyzed by ESI/MS on the PLEX-ID. Mass
spectrometry was performed on a PLEX-ID biosensor (Abbott
Molecular, Des Plaines, IL). After PCR amplification, 30 mL
aliquots of each PCR reaction were desalted and analyzed by mass
spectrometry as previously described [2,4]. Briefly, the PLEX-ID
platform is capable of analyzing nearly 3000 PCR reactions in 24
hours and integrates a novel sample purification scheme with a
high throughput fluidics/robotics platform. The PLEX-ID instru-
ment is comprised of an input plate stacker which accommodates
fifteen 96-well microtiter plates, an automated purification module
which desalts and purifies amplicons with a magnetic-bead-based
weak anion exchange method, and an autosampler coupled to a
novel dual electrospray head which injects analytes into a Perkin
Elmer ESI-TOF mass spectrometer. The platform analyzes one
Table 6. Organisms appropriately detected as threat or near
neighbor.
CRP Cat# Organism
Type: Biothreat
(BT) or Near
Neighbor (NN)
BACI002 B. anthracis V770-NP-1R BT
BACI012 B. anthracis Sterne NN; (pXO2-)
BACI055 B. anthracis Pasteur-Like NN (pXO1-)
BACI124 B. anthracis Vollum 1B BT
BACI126 B. anthracis Pakistan SK-102 BT
BACI123 B. anthracis BT
BACI207 B. anthracis South Africa BT
BACI225 B. anthracis RA3 BT
BACI228 B. cereus 3A NN
BACI232 B. cereus G9241 NN
BACI020 B. coagulans 7050 NN
BURK003 B. pseudomallei 1026B BT
BOTB C. botulinum BB T
FRAN017 F. philomiragia 25016 NN
FRAN003 F. tularensis var novicida 15482 NN
FRAN004 F. tularensis LVS var palearctica NN
FRAN012 F. tularensis BT
FRAN016 F. tularensis Schu S4 BT
FRAN029 F. tularensis BT
RICK002 R. prowazekii Cairo BT
YERS001 Y. enterocolitica 9610 NN
YERS014 Y. enterocolitica NN
YERS015 Y. enterocolitica NN
YERS002 Y. kristensenii 33639 NN
YERS017 Y. pestis Nairobi NN (caf-)
YERS018 Y. pestis PMB19 BT
YERS019 Y. pestis Pestoides B BT
YERS020 Y. pestis Pestoides F NN (pla-)
YERS021 Y. pestis Harbin 35 BT
YERS022 Y. pestis Java 9 NN (caf-)
YERS023 Y. pestis CO92 BT
YERS059 Y. pestis CO92 pgm- NN
YERS061 Y. pestis Kim10 BT
YERS008 Y. pseudotuberculosis 6904 NN
YERS012 Y. ruckeri 29473 NN
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.t006
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PLEX-ID platform utilizes a novel carousel-based design for the
rapid and efficient purification of PCR amplicons. The carousel is
comprised of 22 identical spin cuvette modules in which the
analyte solution is purified prior to ESI-MS analysis. Every 30
seconds the carousel rotates by one position facilitating the
aspiration/or dispensation of the requisite reagents.
Data Analysis and Results Reporting
Data analysis and results reporting was performed in an
automated fashion using on-board computer on the Ibis PLEX-
ID system. For this assay, a customized reporting rule set was
designed that allowed rapid and accurate detection of the
biothreat targets. The biothreat assay report has 21 primer groups
or threat clusters as shown in Figure S2. These groups consist of
primer pairs used to identify the target biothreat organisms. Each
of the threat clusters is treated independently and the results are
reported for each cluster separately. Thus, the presence or absence
of each of the target biothreat clusters is directly reported. Mixed
detections of two or more threats or a threat with an unrelated
near neighbor in another group are also reported. Further, two
additional metrics (Q-score and level) are provided in the report to
assess the quality of the reported detection. The Q-Score is a
rating between 0 (low) and 1 (high) of the confidence in the
identification of the organism. The Q-Score is based on a number
of different parameters such as, the multi-primer joint log
likelihood ratio, which is an indicator of how well the hypothesized
organisms as a group represent the observed data; the multi-
primer single log likelihood ratio, which is an indicator of how
significant the contribution of a single organism is to the solution;
the fraction of missed detections, which represents the percentage
of primers for a detected organism that should have produced
known base count compositions, but did not; and, finally, the
Figure 2. Linearity of response of the biothreat assay. B. anthracis DNA was spiked into AE buffer (Clean) or an extract from an environmental
air filter (Dirty) at concentrations ranging from 0–1000 GE/well. The reported response from the PLEX-ID system was linear over the entire
concentration range tested in both cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.g002
Table 7. Linearity.
Organism Range tested (GE/well)
Linear range
(GE/well)
Bacillus anthracis 1000 200 40 8 2 0–1000
Vaccinia virus 5000 1000 200 40 8 0–5000
Francisella tularensis 1000 200 40 8 2 0–200
Clostridium botulinum 1000 200 40 8 2 0–200
Y. pestis 1000 200 40 8 2 40–1000
Brucella melitensis
1 1000 200 40 8 2 0–200
Vibrio cholerae 1000 200 40 8 2 0–200
Burkholderia mallei 1000 200 40 8 2 40–1000
Salmonella enterica 1000 200 40 8 2 8–40
Clostridium perfringens 1000 200 40 8 2 8–1000
E. coli O157:H7 1000 200 40 8 2 200–1000
Shigella flexneri 1000 200 40 8 2 8–1000
Coxiella burnetii 1000 200 40 8 2 40–1000
Rickettsia prowazekii 1000 200 40 8 2 8–200
VEE 1000 200 40 8 2 8–1000
Influenza 1000 200 40 8 2 Not tested
1Only linear in samples without environmental air background.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036528.t007
Molecular Identification of Biothreat Agents
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 14 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e36528fraction of no data, which indicates the percentage of primers for a
detected organism for which no known data exists within the
PLEX-ID system. For the biothreat assay described here, a Q-
score $0.85 is considered a reportable result. The level is an
indication of the amount of the amplicon present in the sample
reported as genome equivalents/well. This is calculated with
reference to the internal calibrant as described previously [4]. The
normal range for reporting these levels is between 0.16and 106
the levels of internal controls in the assay, which in the case of the
PLEX-ID Biothreat assay represents a working range of ,10 GE/
well to 1000 GE/well.
In addition to the summary style report shown in Figure S2, the
system is capable of reporting organism/strain level matches based
on the genomic sequence data inthe PLEX-ID database (Figure S3).
This is provided as a research utility tool in a separate analysis
workstation. Additional details for each of the matches, including the
detected basecompositions and levels, are available using this report.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Biothreat assay plate layout. Left panel:
Sample wells and target biothreat cluster for each primer pair
are indicated. Each well contains two or three multiplexed primer
pairs. Letters A through H represent 8 rows of a 96-well plate,
whereas numbers 1 through 12 represent the columns. Each
sample is analyzed in 16 PCR reaction wells and six samples can
be tested per PCR plate. Details of the primer pairs are given in
Table 1. Right panel: The 96-well PCR plate layout. Each PCR
well includes a synthetic nucleic acid template that serves as a
calibrant. In multiplexed wells, this calibrant provides an
amplicon similar to the amplicon expected for the organism
shown in red.
(DOCX)
Figure S2 Example of PLEX-ID summary report. Each
biothreat cluster is listed separately. Detection of an organism
within a cluster is listed at the species level. If no organism within
the cluster is detected, the cluster is marked as ‘‘Not Detected’’.
The plasmid markers are listed separately.
(DOCX)
Figure S3 Example of PLEX-ID detailed report. Base
compositions associated with each detection are reported. The
markers (pXO1 and pXO2 in this example) are reported
independently of the biothreat cluster (Bacillus in this case).
(DOCX)
Figure S4 Limits of detection for the biothreat assay.
Left panel: Analytical limits of the multiplexed primer pairs
using synthetic DNA/RNA constructs. Bottom left panel:
Detection of spiked DNA/RNA in AE buffer. Bottom right
panel: Detection of spiked DNA/RNA in ‘‘Dirty Air’’.
The requirement for LOD reporting was detection in all the
primer pairs for any given target. Highlighted cells show the
concentration at which detection of no more than one replicate
was missed.
(DOCX)
Table S1 USAMRIID B. anthracis strains used in the
study.
(DOCX)
Table S2 Base composition signatures for Keim Genet-
ics Lab Bacillus collection. The signatures that are bolded or
italicized indicate a SNP variation compared to the predominant
signature.
(DOCX)
Table S3 Base composition signatures for Keim Genet-
ics Lab Bacillus collection Clade A1a genotypes.
(DOCX)
Table S4 Expected Yersinia pestis genomic signatures
and near-neighbor organism signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S5 Experimental data on Yersinia pestis from the
USAMRIID Collection.
(DOCX)
Table S6 Experimental data on Yersinia pestis near
neighbors.
(DOCX)
Table S7 Francisella tularensis signatures from genome
sequence data and experimental measurements.
(DOCX)
Table S8 Expected Vibrio species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S9 Expected Burkholderia species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S10 Expected Brucella species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S11 Expected Clostridium species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S12 Expected Coxiella species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S13 Expected Rickettsia species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S14 Expected Enterobacteriaceae species signa-
tures.
(DOCX)
Table S15 Expected Shigella species signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S16 Expected Alphavirus signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S17 Expected Orthopoxvirus signatures.
(DOCX)
Table S18 Expected Influenza A virus (H5N1) signatures
and potential overlap with non-H5N1 species.
(DOCX)
Table S19 Expected Filovirus signatures.
(DOCX)
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